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Background: Failure to convey time-critical information to team members during surgery 
diminishes members’ perception of the dynamic information relevant to their task, and compro-
mises shared situational awareness. This research reports the dialog around clinical decisions 
made by team members in the time-pressured and high-risk context of surgery, and the impact 
of these communications on shared situational awareness.
Methods: Fieldwork methods were used to capture the dynamic integration of individual and 
situational elements in surgery that provided the backdrop for clinical decisions. Nineteen 
semistructured interviews were performed with 24 participants from anesthesia, surgery, and 
nursing in the operating rooms of a large metropolitan hospital in Queensland, Australia. 
 Thematic analysis was used.
Results: The domain “coordinating decisions in surgery” was generated from textual data. 
Within this domain, three themes illustrated the dialog of clinical decisions, ie, synchronizing 
and strategizing actions, sharing local knowledge, and planning contingency decisions based 
on priority.
Conclusion: Strategies used to convey decisions that enhanced shared situational awareness 
included the use of “self-talk”, closed-loop communications, and “overhearing” conversations 
that occurred at the operating table. Behaviors that compromised a team’s shared situational 
awareness included tunneling and fixating on one aspect of the situation.
Keywords: shared situational awareness, surgery, distributed dialog
Introduction
Surgery is an integral component of global health care, with an estimated 234 mil-
lion operations being performed annualy worldwide.1 However, the operating room is 
imperiled by the threat of adverse events, many of which are related to communica-
tion. Insufficient or ineffective communication is the most frequent cause of adverse 
events across all areas of health care, culminating in harms that range from delays in 
treatment to medication errors to wrong site surgery.2–4 A systematic review of adverse 
event studies revealed that 41% of all hospital adverse events occurred in the high-risk 
milieu of the operating room5 and a retrospective audit of patient medical records sug-
gested that 50% of identified events were preventable.6 Specifically, communication 
and teamwork failures in surgery were identified as a contributing factor in 38% of 
incidents in nonemergency procedures and could impact in up to 59% of incidents in 
emergency cases.3 While the imperative to avoid communication errors in the operat-
ing room is widely promulgated in patient safety discourse, progress has been slow.7,8 
Ambiguities, silences, or omissions in conveying clinical decisions to other members 
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of the surgical team during the intraoperative period impact 
on team cohesion, hamper performance, and can contribute 
to procedural error. However, there is a paucity of research 
describing the information rendered in creating the dialog 
around clinical decisions among members of the surgical 
teams. The aim of this observational study was to describe 
the strategies used to communicate decisions during surgery 
and the ways in which this dialog creates or compromises 
shared situational awareness.
The concept of situational awareness was first described 
in aviation to explain the perceptual skills needed for the 
success of fighter pilots.9 Situational awareness refers to an 
 individual’s ability to maintain the “big picture” in a dynami-
cally changing environment.10 Endsley11 proposed three levels 
of situational awareness based on perception, comprehension 
and understanding, and projection. Put simply, situational 
awareness is characterized by three questions, “Where have 
we come from?”, “Where are we now?”, and “Where are we 
going?”.12 Within the three levels of situational awareness, 
four key factors in Endsley’s11 model include: the role of 
goals in directing attention to determining the significance 
of perceived information; the role of expectations informed 
by current perceptions of the situation; different methods of 
information processing (eg, analytic and intuitive decision-
making) to achieve situational awareness; and the salience of 
feedback in maintaining situational awareness. As such, situ-
ational awareness relies on differentiating situations that may 
appear to be similar to determine the scope of the  situation.13 
Each situation has its own associated set of possible futures, 
depending on the actions of the individual. Situations are 
classified on a continuum ranging from clear, routine, and 
easily managed at one extreme, to confusing and dangerous, 
requiring particular skills and expertise.13
In surgery, teams of surgeons, anesthetists, nurses, and 
technicians work together on tasks towards a common end 
goal. While situational awareness is critical to the perfor-
mance of individuals, it is also crucial to the performance 
of the team as a collective.14 Shared situational awareness is 
when members have an appreciation of each other’s  activities 
and share common perspectives of events and goals.15 Shared 
situational awareness suggests that during team activities, 
situational awareness overlaps and individuals need to 
perceive, comprehend, and project situational awareness 
components specific to their role in the team. Successful 
performance consequently requires that team members have 
a good situational awareness of their specific components and 
also similar situational awareness for shared components.10,16 
Specifically, shared situational awareness requires team 
members to have an understanding of the type of information 
needed by others, knowledge of the devices used to distribute 
situational awareness (eg, shared visual displays), shared 
team processes to facilitate sharing of relevant information 
(eg, communication, coordination, cooperation), and shared 
mechanisms, ie, a shared mental model.10,14 A shared mental 
model enables team members to adapt swiftly and coordi-
nate their actions based on their underlying knowledge and 
understanding of each other and of the present situation.16 
In high performance teams, when a significant change in 
the situation is detected, a more focused assessment takes 
place, rendering a proactive rather than reactive response to 
expected and unexpected events.14
While there is a need for teams to cultivate shared situ-
ational awareness through effective communication, individ-
ual members often experience disconnections in situational 
awareness.14 Disconnections in situational awareness can 
occur when information is not passed between members in a 
clear and concise manner. In addition, when the information 
is passed on to others, team members may interpret the infor-
mation differently, based on dissimilar mental models.14,16 
Finally, even when team members share a similar compre-
hension of the current situation, they may have disparate 
projections of what is likely to happen. Thus, the different 
mental models that team members possess have a bearing on 
the predictions they make.14 Communicating consequential 
information during surgery ensures that members are “on the 
same page” and enhances coordination.
Previous human factors research has examined the broad 
domains of situational awareness.10–13 However, there is lim-
ited research that describes the dialog of clinical decisions 
communicated to team members and how this enhances or 
compromises the team’s shared situational awareness. Studies 
of coordinating decision-making are rare, and have tended to 
focus on the technical aspects of surgical procedures,17 while 
others have explicitly focused on the role of the surgeon17–19 
or the scrub nurse,20 with little attention given to the surgical 
team as a collective. In the operating room, team members 
often have to make decisions under time pressure, increas-
ing risk, and when unforeseen conditions and unanticipated 
problems emerge. This is not only pertinent to emergency 
surgery, because capricious situations requiring new deci-
sions and/or a change of plan may also occur during elective 
surgery. This study is important because it identifies strate-
gies that may help team members build shared situational 
awareness. It is useful to understand the dialog that underpins 
decision-making in surgery. The strategies used to support 
this dialog build situational awareness and allow members 
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to recognize aspects of the situation that may pose a threat to 
safety and ensure that, if required, other team members are 
able to respond in a timely and appropriate way.
Materials and methods
A qualitative study design based on fieldwork methods 
using participant observations and semistructured interviews 
allowed us to describe the content and context of dialog 
around decisions, and the ways in which this enhances or 
hampers team members’ ability to build shared situational 
awareness.
setting and sample
This study was conducted in the operating department of a 
large metropolitan teaching hospital that caters for all surgical 
specialties, except for gynecology, obstetrics, and  pediatrics, 
in Queensland, Australia. At the time of this study, the 
operating suite had 22 commissioned operating rooms and 
performed over 18,000 operative procedures annually. The 
department was staffed by over 250 health care professionals 
who held surgical, medical, nursing, and ancillary roles and 
provided around-the-clock coverage.
In this facility, the team consisted of surgical and 
anesthetic consultants and their trainees and residents, 
and registered and/or enrolled nurses practicing in scrub, 
scout, or anesthetic roles (in this facility, registered and 
licensed practical nurses were employed to perform scrub 
 [instrument]), scout [circulating], and anesthesia assistance 
roles. Participants were purposively selected,21 based on 
their ability to render useful insights on this subject, and 
consisted of members from surgery, anesthetics, and nursing. 
The choice of surgical procedures was purposive and partici-
pants were drawn from interdisciplinary groups who worked 
across 10 surgical specialties (ie, vascular, cardiac, general, 
orthopedic, ophthalmology, otolaryngology, faciomaxillary, 
plastics, urology, and neurosurgery). Maximum variation 
sampling21 was used to capture diverse characteristics in 
relation to different surgical specialties, divergent levels of 
clinical experience, and subspecialty roles. By comparing the 
responses and experiences of participants against each other, 
discrete but important differences were uncovered21 about 
teamwork and decision-making practices in surgery.
Data collection
Fieldwork progressed over 6 months and data were collected 
during 2009–2010. Methods included a reflective diary, 
participant observation, field notes, and focused interviews. 
The authenticity of a field study relies on the experience and 
expertise of the observer. The first-named author (BG) was 
trained in human factors research, had extensive experience 
as an operating room nurse, and performed all field work 
observations and interviews. BG kept a diary and journaled 
her perceptions prior to, during, and after field work to reduce 
the propensity to accept any internalized, taken-for-granted 
assumptions about context.22 During fieldwork, BG was 
located away from the operating table, with each team mem-
ber and all entrances to the room in view.
Semistructured interviews were used to elicit participant 
perceptions23 of teamwork practices and decision-making 
in surgery. Participants also validated information gathered 
through other sources, including observations and state-
ments made by other team members. Interviews lasted 
25–60  minutes, and were conducted at the discretion of the 
participant in a room away from the main work area. Based 
on their personal preference, participants were either inter-
viewed in groups or individually. A general interview guide 
was used and topics covered explored issues surrounding 
the contextual factors that fostered or threatened effective 
interdisciplinary teamwork. As the fieldwork progressed, 
questions varied and new questions were asked based on 
emergent findings. For example, the majority of medical 
participants described communications that occurred around 
clinical decision-making. Therefore, additional questions, 
ie, “How did you know to make the decision?”, “What 
information did you need?”, and “How was this informa-
tion conveyed to other team members?”, were asked in 
subsequent interviews. Data saturation was evident as the 
analysis progressed and precipitated an end point to data 
collection when no new information was revealed. Prior to 
commencing the interviews, demographic data were col-
lected in respect to participant age, years of experience, and 
professional role. All interviews were digitally recorded for 
later transcription.
Ethics
Ethics approval was given by the human research ethics com-
mittees of the hospital and the university. No members of 
staff were interviewed or observed without informed  written 
consent being obtained. During the study period, consent was 
renegotiated and participants were informed about their right 
to withdraw at any time.
Analysis
The analysis was performed using the transcribed field notes 
and interviews in an iterative manner that involved open 
coding and categorizing to develop themes.23 Codes were 
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developed based on topics raised by participants in relation 
to teamwork practices and were subsequently categorized 
based on their similarities and differences. Thematic analysis 
involved a process of breaking down, examining, comparing, 
and conceptualizing data to enable recognition of emerging 
patterns to identify major themes.24 Theme identification 
reflected recurring events and dialog with similar content, 
both within and across the textual data. The themes extracted 
and their corresponding explanatory data were crosschecked 
among the research team to ensure consensus. In labeling the 
themes, a thick description was used to indicate the context 
from which they were drawn. During analysis, meetings 
were held with the coresearchers to discuss and reconsider 
emerging themes and subthemes.
Rigor
In establishing trustworthiness, the tenets of auditability, 
triangulation, and transferability were considered.25,26 All 
members of the research team were involved in data analysis 
in order to identify irregularities and establish consistency. 
Once complete, the preliminary findings were taken back 
to participants for clarification and confirmation. Memos 
connecting emerging f indings to pieces of verbatim-
supported emergent themes, and demonstrated an audit 
trail.  Triangulation was achieved through use of multiple 
data sources, which allowed a broad range of issues to be 
crosschecked, achieving convergent validity.26 There was 
purposive selection of a wide range of participants, based 
on maximum variation21 which enabled a comprehensive 
overview of the phenomena under study, so there may be 
conceptual transference to other similar settings.
Results
Over 500 hours of observations were recorded involving 
39 surgeons, 26 anesthetists, 63 nurses, and 15 ancillary 
staff across 10 surgical specialties. During the 6-month 
observational period, 160 surgical procedures were observed. 
In total, 16 individual and three group interviews were 
conducted with 24 participants (Table 1). Participant age 
ranged between 23 and 66 years, and their years of clinical 
experience from 12 months to 40 years.
The domain of coordinating decision-making in surgery 
encompassed the complexity of the surgery, the condition 
of the patient, knowledge of the task, and the skills and 
abilities of other team members. “Coordination” concerned 
the deliberate effort at managing the task through explicit 
distributed communication that allowed team members to 
build their situational awareness. “Clinical decision-making” 
entailed identifying and considering options, selecting and 
communicating options, and re-evaluating and reviewing 
decisions based on these options. Subsumed within this 
domain were three interlinking themes, ie, synchronizing 
actions and strategizing to adapt, sharing local knowledge, 
and planning contingency decisions based on priority. 
Table 2 shows each of these themes and their supporting 
subthemes. What follows is an interpretative account of each 
theme with supporting verbatim.
synchronizing actions and strategizing  
to adapt
The theme of synchronizing actions and strategizing to adapt 
was underpinned by the capacity of team members to com-
municate decisions in the management and timing of indi-
vidual and team tasks in an explicit manner. “Synchronizing” 
and “strategizing” incorporated communicating a course of 
action based on team members’ level of situational awareness. 
The use of open explicit dialog around decisions facilitated 
distributed situational awareness, allowing participants 
to respond appropriately to the cues provided by others. 
However, there were also occasions when participants 
described the need to consciously focus on the task at hand, 
even if this at times culminated in loss of the peripheral 
information sources needed to inform such decisions. For 
instance, anesthetist participants particularly emphasized 
the use of algorithms as a decision-making strategy to deal 
with an anesthetic emergency:
“You have a series of algorithms which you go through but 
because you have a reasonable idea of what is going wrong, 
you step into the algorithm half way down it instead of 
starting at the top and then because you are wrong you get 
the wrong result … You get fixated and finish up thinking 
you are quite sure you are getting evidence but then the 
Table 1 Number of participants interviewed, method of interview, 
and specialty
Participants (n) Method of interview Specialty
13 nurses 1 group 
2 groups 
5 individual
Cardiac 
All other specialties
6 anesthetists 6 individual Cardiac 
All other specialties
5 surgeons 5 individual Vascular 
General 
Orthopedic 
Plastics 
Neurosurgery
Total 24 participants 19 interviews
submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
Dovepress 
Dovepress
112
Gillespie et al
 
Jo
ur
na
l o
f M
ul
tid
isc
ip
lin
ar
y 
He
al
th
ca
re
 d
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 h
ttp
s:
//w
ww
.d
ov
ep
re
ss
.c
om
/ b
y 
13
1.
18
1.
16
4.
37
 o
n 
11
-A
pr
-2
01
7
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
                               1 / 1
Journal of Multidisciplinary Healthcare 2013:6
 capacity to convey decisions to others at the height of a 
crisis situation.
Decisions around controlling the tempo of surgery during 
crucial stages were described:
“I deliberately, consciously slow down, when I am doing 
a hepatectomy; just near the end there is a rush, the organ 
is hanging on by a slither, you have a huge amount of 
liver coming out, your big hand hanging onto it and the 
temptation is to draw on it and accelerate the process which 
increases a vascular injury so it is at that point where I say 
publically to everyone ‘I am going to slow down because 
I am getting to the critical last little step’. I talk people 
through what I am doing and am talking myself through 
it … I like to have as much correspondence as possible at 
that critical time.” (Consultant surgeon, interview 16)
The overt act of “talking through” the delicate concluding 
stages of the procedure enhanced team situational awareness 
because it served a dual purpose: it permitted the surgeon to 
keep abreast of the situation, achieve coherence and agreement 
with other team members on the goals of the task; and also 
allowed the surgeon to be more accessible to the assistance, 
suggestions, advice or questions from others. In contrast, junior 
surgeons tended to fixate on the technical problem during 
critical periods of the operation, and reduced the exchange of 
information to a minimum during that time. Only information 
related to perceptions of the status and dynamic components 
of the immediate situation, ie, level 1 situational awareness,11 
was communicated to others under the assumption that they 
would reach similar projections as the operating surgeon.
Scrub nurses articulated the importance of organizing the 
layout of their sterile work area in a way that it allowed them 
to place their hand directly onto the instrument without look-
ing away from the operative field. Experienced scrub nurses 
focused on the operative field and listened for conversational 
exchanges between consultant surgeons and their trainees 
to learn of changes to the operative plan. These behaviors 
increased nurses’ levels of situational awareness and they were 
able to pre-empt the surgeon’s needs and “think ahead” to 
ensure that the operation progressed smoothly. An experienced 
nurse stated that her decisions on the selection of instrument 
to pass to the surgeon at any given stage of the operation were 
essentially governed by her understanding and conception of 
“what’s happening now, and what can possibly go wrong”.
sharing local knowledge
The second theme, ie, sharing local knowledge, encom-
passed context-specific understandings of individuals and 
Table 2 Domain themes and their supporting subthemes
Theme Supporting subtheme
synchronizing actions  
and strategizing to adapt
• Coping with competing demands 
•  Deviating from procedural flow 
•  Rethinking the procedure 
•  Leading 
•  Taking cues 
•  Discussing concerns 
•  seeking correspondence 
•  Recognizing errors 
•  shutting down
sharing local knowledge •  Knowing the patient 
•  Knowing the procedure 
•  Knowing each other 
•  Following the procedure 
•  Being on the same page 
•   Relying on previous knowledge  
and experience
•  Understanding individual variability
Planning contingency  
decisions based on priority
•  Deciding what is urgent 
•  Thinking one’s way through 
•  Pressing the emergency button 
•  Modifying activity/procedure 
•  Getting stuck 
•  Making a judgment call 
•  Making high-risk clinical decisions
lights go on and you go ‘oh no, I was wrong’.” (Consultant 
anesthetist, interview 7)
This anesthetist’s failures in perception and comprehen-
sion of the situation resulted in an incomplete mental model. 
Consequently, an over-reliance on a set of prescribed steps 
stymied this participant’s ability to resolve the problem at 
hand because he was locked into an incorrect picture of the 
situation. It was only when an adverse event occurred that 
the anesthetist realized his comprehension of the situation 
was flawed. Another participant revealed that when an error 
in judgment occurred, the ability to process information from 
other sources rapidly diminished:
“When you have a situation where something does go unex-
pectedly wrong or you do something that has a bad outcome 
and things are deteriorating quickly then you feel the anxiety 
rising, you focus, you tunnel, you really are trying to think 
clearly but because there is all this ‘oh my God, oh my God 
what have I done?’, when things go wrong unexpectedly 
because you have done something, you are so focused on 
that that you often forget about the peripherals. You almost 
shut down … ” (Consultant anesthetist, interview 6)
The distress of having an unfavorable outcome had 
a debilitating impact on this participant’s situational 
awareness, causing her to “shut down”, thus limiting her 
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the situation as a whole, as well as its many facets, and the 
ways such understandings contributed to the communication 
of decisions to build shared situational awareness. “Local 
knowledge” referred to team members’ awareness of nuances 
and practices of individuals and their roles in the context of 
different surgical specialties. Accordingly, team members’ 
awareness of individual capabilities, the ability of members 
to cohese as a collective, the condition of the patient, and the 
status of the procedure being performed, and the environment 
(equipment, position of the patient, room layout), not only 
influenced the decisions made, but also how the dialog was 
constructed and conveyed.
Shared situational awareness in cardiac surgery was fos-
tered by the deliberate use of closed-loop communication to 
convey that the steps taken in making a decision were purpose-
ful, logical, and deliberate. In the cardiac room, tasks around 
perfusion and cardioplegia were managed by the perfusionist 
and cardiac surgeon through a series of sequenced actions and 
minicommunications with the aim of identifying the cause of 
the problem and returning the patient’s system to a more nor-
mal, desirable state.27 In the context of this study, a perfusionist 
is an anesthesiologist who has received additional specialist 
training in cardiac perfusion and cardioplegia. Coordination of 
actions was frequently heralded by a deliberate annunciation 
of steps taken by the perfusionist and surgeon, making explicit 
their expectations based on the current situation:
“In cardiac anesthesia and perfusion the rule is that when 
you are given an instruction or asked to do something, you 
confirm verbally that that is what you are doing … Cardiac 
is very regimented, there is one way of doing things and 
that is it. I anaesthetize and perfuse differently and behave 
differently in cardiac than I do in general theaters.” (Con-
sultant anesthetist, interview 12)
In the cardiac room, attention to the orchestration of 
actions allowed both the surgeon and perfusionist to rec-
ognize urgency and use appropriate recovery methods to 
manage deviations from expected events. The dialog around 
decisions in the cardiac room was in stark contrast with the 
way decisions were communicated among team members in 
other surgical specialties. For example, conveying or con-
firming decisions about a change in case requirements (eg, 
impending need for a microscope) or changes in the order 
of patients listed for a morning or afternoon session based 
on procedural complexity and the availability of consultant 
surgical expertise, appeared to be made independently, 
without consultation with other key personnel in the room. 
In this instance, the disparate mental models that members 
possessed likely influenced their comprehension and the 
projections they made.
Although procedures may be booked as elective or 
 “routine”, cardiovascular fluctuations during surgery, 
and variations in the acuity of the patient and their surgi-
cal  anatomy, influenced clinical decisions concerning the 
approach and ongoing management of these cases:
“There will be lots of little subtleties that have gone on 
in raising a flap, transposing a flap, in doing a resection, 
whatever. Those little changes that have occurred throughout 
the operation, it is still the same operation but it is different 
from the way you might have done it last week. If you haven’t 
seen all those things it might affect the way you communicate 
in the operation.” (Trainee surgeon, interview 8)
For this participant, prospectively communicating 
decisions based on changes in case needs and/or patient 
status alleviated the trepidation associated with potential 
or projected changes in tissue vascularity that frequently 
occurred during microsurgery. This behavior also served to 
inform other team members, thus building shared situational 
awareness. The observer witnessed instances when surgeons 
requested instruments and additional equipment to be taken 
onto the table in anticipation that they would be needed, albeit 
that they were not always used. Giving this information well 
in advance permitted scrub nurses to prepare for probable 
challenges or changes. In contrast, delays, silences, or omis-
sions in communicating imminent case needs to other team 
members based on a change in plan or approach culminated 
in members of the surgical subteam waiting at the operating 
table for an additional piece of equipment. As such, proce-
dural disruptions occurred when the scout nurse left the room 
to retrieve a particular instrument or tray. Clearly, disparate 
levels of access to vital information impacted on team mem-
bers’ situational awareness, leading to different projections 
of what was likely to occur in the near future.
Nurse participants described behaviors that augmented 
their situational awareness. For instance, the importance of 
being focused throughout the operation in respect to careful 
listening and intent watching; thus, knowing and understand-
ing the normal sequences of the procedure was considered 
essential in gleaning useful information about the progress 
of surgery. In selected instances, the scrub nurse became the 
“gatekeeper” to the surgeon,28 vetting information flow based 
on their assessment of the status of the procedure:
“The scrub nurse is the best person to make the judgment 
as to when to ask for things because they know what part of 
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the operation is the most critical or noncritical.” (Registered 
nurse, interview 2)
Determining what information should be filtered through 
to the surgeon encompassed several factors, ie, experienced 
scrub nurses possessed good technical and scientific knowl-
edge of the procedure being performed, an appreciation of its 
intricate and difficult stages, and had an understanding of any 
subtle changes in the demeanor of individual surgeons. Both 
scrub and scout nurses were less likely to interrupt when the 
procedure was at a stage that required intense concentration 
by the surgeon, such as during the clipping of a cerebral 
aneurysm in neurosurgery. Scout nurses also judged the 
urgency of incoming messages when answering cell phones 
or by questioning the approaching outsider regarding the 
details of the message. More experienced nurses intuitively 
discerned the surgeon’s mood and used this knowledge to 
inform decisions about how they would interact with them, 
altering their approach as necessary.
Planning contingency decisions 
based on priority
The final theme, ie, planning contingency decisions based 
on priority, illustrated the unpredictable nature of a myriad 
of clinical scenarios and the dilemmas confronting team 
members when making decisions about the urgency of events. 
“Contingency decisions” referred to timely and explicit 
dialog based on a change of plan or priority, and thus fos-
tered shared situational awareness. The majority of medical 
participants affirmed that “judgment calls” involved making 
decisions around priorities of care; the essence of which was 
captured in this comment by one of the trainee surgeons:
“ … an emergency is by its nature very different than an 
elective case. So the goals are different.” 
Yet decisions based on the priorities of patient care were not 
always mutually agreed upon, or discussed.
“ From a basis of not having seen the patient, the surgeon 
has booked the case and they will give it a ‘category 1’ 
being the most urgent and ‘5’ being almost elective, but 
they often incorrectly categorize their patients so they 
appear to be more urgent so they are done in hours or at 
a convenient time or will say ‘this is an urgent case but 
we are not available until 5 pm’. We end up saying ‘that’s 
rubbish you are not doing that or okay this case needs to 
go before that case’. We often have to bump the orthopods 
out of theater to do an appendix or something.” (Consultant 
anesthetist, interview 7)
This scenario was common, ie, the triaging anesthetist’s 
decisions were informed by the urgency of the procedure 
and how “sick” the patient was. Floor coordinating nurses 
also made decisions around assigning priority when elec-
tive lists would over-run. The priority given to which listed 
cases would be cancelled was driven by time constraints and 
limited staffing to cover list over-runs. Such decisions were 
also informed by the coordinating nurse’s knowledge of the 
procedure, and how long it would take individual surgeons to 
complete the procedure within the remainder of the session. 
The coordinating nurse would enter the room and, in a low 
tone, speak quietly to the anesthetist, seeking agreement and 
support for the decision to cancel the case. Once agreement 
had been reached, the decision was subsequently communi-
cated to the attending surgeon. Conversely, there were times 
when semielective or emergent cases could be booked or 
added to a surgical list; accordingly, both the surgeon and 
the anesthetist in the room were approached simultaneously 
by the coordinating nurse.
In assessing the situation and prioritizing actions, sur-
geons described “threats” in terms of the patient (atypical 
anatomy, adhesions from previous surgery, unexpected 
findings, excessive blood loss), the task (visibility or access 
problems, time pressure), and the team (inexperience, 
 unfamiliarity with the procedure). “Risk” was considered 
in terms of potential harm to the patient, the surgeon, other 
team members, and the organization.19 The imperative to 
adapt or change in crisis situations and manage risk was 
patently illustrated when a surgeon participant abandoned 
his original operative plan because the patient’s condition 
was obviously deteriorating. In articulating the need to 
change pace and shift strategies during surgery, he elo-
quently described decision-making that was based on a 
hypothesized outcome:
“I said to her (scrub nurse), ‘We need to get this patient 
closed’ (patient’s wound incision) because we did switch our 
strategy. At a certain stage in the operation it switches from 
conventional surgery to what we call ‘damage control’ where 
you stop all the bleeding, control the bowel contamination, 
but as soon as you have done that, you hurry up, pack the 
patient and send them quickly to ICU. So I had to say ‘we 
are changing the pace now’. It is a really important change 
in strategy and this all comes from trauma protocols.” 
 (Consultant surgeon, interview 16)
Based on the surgeon’s assessment of the current situa-
tion, he believed that there was little choice because of the 
tenuous balance of risk involved in unnecessarily prolonging 
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this critical surgery. The priority was to prevent further dete-
rioration and deal with life-threatening injuries rather than to 
restore function, reconstruct tissues, or improve perfusion. 
While other options may have been momentarily considered, 
the patient’s deteriorating condition meant that the definitive 
course of action, with apparently little conscious deliberation, 
was conveyed to the scrub nurse.  During decision-making, 
the experience of the surgeon and his or her ability to pro-
cess information efficiently from other sources informed the 
decision. The delivery of explicit and timely dialog supple-
mented the mental model of other team members, building 
shared situational awareness, assisting members in preparing 
for a change of plan. In many instances, participants had 
to retrieve information regularly from multiple sources to 
make informed decisions, but often only had access to par-
tial information that was relevant to a successful outcome. 
Consequently, on occasions when “bigger picture” informa-
tion was not volunteered, disparities in the perceived level 
of risk were further compounded:
“If you are going into a case, a situation where you don’t 
perceive there is great risk, the surgeon may perceive there is 
great risk but that hasn’t been communicated. We go into a 
situation where we are dealing with someone who is a great 
risk but they are only operating on a toe nail … once you 
have started if something is not quite right or if perhaps you 
are starting on a path the rest of the team mightn’t know.” 
(Consultant anesthetist, interview 3)
Discussion
The findings herein suggest that “coordinating decision-
making in surgery” encompassed synchronizing and strat-
egizing actions, sharing local knowledge, and planning and 
prioritizing contingency decisions. Explicit, distributed, and 
timely communication is crucial in facilitating the exchange 
of information for cohesive teamwork, as tasks and roles 
are deconstructed, performed and reconstructed in their 
entirety.29 In this study, efficient communication of clinical 
decisions heightened team members’ awareness of actual or 
potential problems, building shared situational awareness and 
assisting them to respond appropriately.
The first theme, ie, synchronizing and strategizing 
actions, described behaviors associated with decisions 
around focusing on the immediate task, controlling the pace 
of surgery through “self-talk”, and “thinking ahead” by the 
surgeon. At critical junctures of the procedure, the effects of 
stress were evidenced in the ways that the communication 
patterns of surgeons and anesthetists changed in the absence 
of discussing crucial “next step” decisions. Some junior 
 doctors “shut down” and, instead, compensated by fixating on 
the technicalities of the task. Alternatively, more experienced 
surgeons were able to sustain open dialog with others, thus 
explicitly coordinating tasks. The use of “self-talk” appeared 
to be pivotal in maintaining shared situational awareness, 
and also enabled surgeons to manage their stress levels. 
 “Self-talk” is described as the purposeful internal conversa-
tion that motivates an individual’s performance. The ongoing 
dialog assists others to maintain vigilance, particularly during 
high tempo periods, because less information needs to be 
communicated relative to what is already mutually known 
and understood.30
Scrub nurses’ behavior of “overhearing” conversations 
at the operating table heightened their situational awareness. 
Overhearing conversations may be likened to using “voice 
loops” where individuals or groups obtain direct, real-time 
updates for a particular decision-maker.31 A “voice loop” is 
a real-time auditory prompt that enables distributed trans-
lation of information among individuals in close physical 
 proximity. Voice loops, although uncommon in health 
care environments, are increasingly being recognized as an 
effective coordinating tool in high dependency settings.31 
In our study, the act of listening in enabled scrub nurses 
to coordinate their activities, anticipate unexpected events, 
plan contingency responses, understand the rationale for 
nonroutine requests, and note fluctuations in voice tone that 
may signal an escalation in activity. Nurses were thus able to 
participate actively in decision-making around coordination 
of personnel and equipment needs on selected occasions. 
Our findings extend recent research which suggests that 
nurses have limited scope to make decisions in the operating 
room milieu.20 While nurses within surgical teams are not 
responsible for making “life and death” decisions in surgery, 
they are privy to many clinical decisions, and are thus tasked 
with communicating decisions about the synchronization 
of activities to others, and act as conduits of information. 
 Concordant with recent research,20 the nurses in this study 
used situational awareness to build a mental model by gath-
ering cues presented in the environment and integrating 
information from an array of sources, much of which was 
based on their familiarity and experience with the surgeon 
and the procedure.
The second theme, ie, sharing local knowledge, illustrated 
the importance of previous exposure to similar situations, 
understanding other team members’ capabilities, and the 
ways in which their roles and tasks intersected to meet shared 
team goals and expectations, and the use of closed-loop 
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communication. Complete shared situational awareness is 
often impossible, but using closed-loop communication 
guides effective coordination, and its absence diminishes 
team members’ ability to develop a shared mental model.32 
In the cardiac room, the surgeon and the perfusionist have 
limited access to information that is relevant to a successful 
outcome.27 Both the surgeon and perfusionist perform distinct 
tasks that demand unique expertise, yet these actions require 
careful orchestration if they are to meet the shared goals of 
surgery. Situational awareness arises out of the process of 
using closed-loop communication in cardiac surgery because 
these structured minicommunications establish the current 
state of the patient’s system and the sequencing of actions 
needed to perform tasks.27
Nurse participants in our study tended to make intui-
tive decisions based on experiential knowledge, and this 
accords with previous research.33 Nurses’ decisions centered 
on coordinating case requirements, booking and cancelling 
listed procedures, and choosing the most appropriate way to 
approach different surgeons according to their demeanor and 
situation. Nurses filtered information that reached the surgeon, 
thus permitting surgeons to remain disconnected and separate 
from their broader environment, and allowing surgeons to 
concentrate on “the act of surgery”, which are notions identi-
fied in earlier critical discourse.28 “Gating” information flow 
appeared to reduce the incidence of interruptions which have 
been previously identified as contributing to clinical error.34,35 
However, vetting information may also have undesirable, 
unintended effects, ie, selectively communicating information 
to surgeons that nurses deemed as nonurgent may have con-
tributed to an error elsewhere. Essentially, in this situation, it is 
likely difficult for nurses to make distinctions between urgent 
and nonurgent messages because they do not necessarily know 
the context or the vital background information.
The final theme illustrated team behaviors around plan-
ning and prioritizing contingency decisions. The level to 
which participants were able to build situational awareness 
was determined by their ability to foresee, manage, and com-
municate their assessment of potential situational risks. Most 
medical participants in our study considered clinical decision-
making in terms of patient-related or task-related risks, and 
echoes findings elsewhere.18,19 Senior surgeons illustrated 
situations where emergency decisions were underpinned by 
a judgment of likelihood or an estimation of risk, ie, deci-
sions that are likely to be made on the basis of intuition and 
experience.19 However, it appeared that some participants 
had limited access to all relevant information regarding risk, 
limiting their ability to respond as expected. When decisions 
were enacted in emergency and time-pressured situations, 
distributed communication about the level of risk was, at 
times, constrained. In other cases, differing comprehensions 
of the current situation (levels 1 and 2 situational awareness)32 
secondary to disagreements about the patient’s level of risk, 
may lead to an unfavorable outcome. Situation assessment 
requires cognitive processing, and therefore contributes 
to workload.29 Conceivably, situational awareness suffers 
because of competing demands, and even striking events can 
be missed because they are outside the individual’s sphere of 
attention at that time.
strengths and limitations
This study has a number of strengths, but we also recognize 
that several limitations exist. First, the single locale of the 
study setting limits the extent to which its findings may 
be generalized because the staff working in this hospital 
may be different in some way. Despite this, there was rep-
resentation across disciplines, permitting illumination of 
diverse professional perspectives and enhancing conceptual 
 transferability.21 Further, our findings are consistent with 
those of several other studies of communication and decision-
making in surgery.18–20 Second, there are innate complexities 
in examining a context with which the observer has a high 
degree of familiarity. Still, preconceived assumptions were 
challenged by diarizing field experiences and writing memos 
to enhance objectivity and professional judgment.22 As such, 
the effects of bias during data collection, interpretation, and 
description were minimized. Finally, the differing methods 
used for some of the nurse participants may have given rise 
to different dynamics during interviews. However, similar 
issues were explored and data saturation was achieved. 
Further, the variety of interview techniques responded to 
participants’ preferences.
Conclusion
Our findings suggest that communicating clinical informa-
tion is significant in building shared situational awareness. 
 Behaviors such as the use of self-talk, closed-loop com-
munication, and overhearing conversations help teams to 
build shared situational awareness. Such behaviors allow 
team members to coordinate actions with others better, 
broadening the expertise and sphere of attention and reduc-
ing fixation. Thus team members are enabled to perform 
their roles in parallel and strategize accordingly. Any 
associated deficits in selectively attending to messages, 
transmitting information to the appropriate personnel, 
seeking additional information from key personnel, and 
submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
Dovepress 
Dovepress
117
shared situational awareness in surgery
 
Jo
ur
na
l o
f M
ul
tid
isc
ip
lin
ar
y 
He
al
th
ca
re
 d
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 h
ttp
s:
//w
ww
.d
ov
ep
re
ss
.c
om
/ b
y 
13
1.
18
1.
16
4.
37
 o
n 
11
-A
pr
-2
01
7
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
                               1 / 1
Journal of Multidisciplinary Healthcare
Publish your work in this journal
Submit your manuscript here: http://www.dovepress.com/journal-of-multidisciplinary-healthcare-journal
The Journal of Multidisciplinary Healthcare is an international, peer-
reviewed open-access journal that aims to represent and publish research 
in healthcare areas delivered by practitioners of different disciplines. This 
includes studies and reviews conducted by multidisciplinary teams as 
well as research which evaluates the results or conduct of such teams or 
healthcare processes in general. The journal covers a wide range of areas 
and welcomes submission from practitioners at all levels, from all over 
the world. The manuscript management system is completely online and 
includes a very quick and fair peer-review system. Visit http://www.dove-
press.com/testimonials.php to read real quotes from published authors.
Journal of Multidisciplinary Healthcare 2013:6
eliciting a useful response, compounds the potential for 
adverse patient outcomes.
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